Part I of the article discusses the role of public participation in the regulatory process. Part II provides a history of Louisiana Senate Bill 549-a failed 2010 attempt to de-lawyer the Tulane Environmental Law Clinic's (TELC's) clients-and shows that such an attempt to stifle legal advocacy is a disreputable tactic. Part III analyzes Senate Bill 549 in light of the federal preemption doctrine, demonstrating that the bill conflicts with federal policy and that it cannot be justified in terms of legitimate state objectives. Part IV shows that bringing a preemption claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may enable a prevailing plaintiff to recover attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 . 10 The article concludes in Part V that the preemption doctrine is a useful tool in the effort to stop de-lawyering of an environmental law clinic's clients.
I. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND THE REGULATORY PROCESS
When Congress mandated opportunities for the public to participate in environmental decisionmaking, it opened a wideranging dialogue. Some of the issues involved are relatively cut and dried. For example: in a nation governed by the rule of law, industrial facilities should comply with their permits.
11 When people violate the law and contaminate public resources, most people would agree that the violators should be held accountable. 12 To supplement 10 Section 1983 provides a remedy for people injured by being deprived of their constitutional or statutory rights "under color of" state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) 
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[Vol. 61:4 government enforcement, Congress empowered "any person" to bring enforcement action under many modern antipollution laws, effectively deputizing members of the public to act as "private attorneys general" to help uphold the rule of law. 13 When this type of public participation helps identify and prosecute lawbreakers, what complaint can there be? 14 Congress also gave ordinary citizens the right to participate in public dialogue about more complex, inherently debatable issues. Administrative proceedings about whether the government should issue particular environmental permits, for instance, can turn on difficult questions for which there are no clear, right or wrong answers. Here are some examples of issues with which Louisiana residents have grappled:
• Is a proposed industrial facility the right fit for the neighborhood in which its proponents seek to build? 15 • Must an historic neighborhood be sacrificed to make way for the promise of a new medical complex? 16 undesirable and unconstitutional consequence of today's decision [upholding citizens' standing to sue about Clean Water Act violations] is to place the immense power of suing to enforce the public laws in private hands."). 13 See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 165 (1997) (" [T] he obvious purpose of the [Endangered Species Act's citizen-suit provision] is to encourage enforcement by so-called 'private attorneys general . . . .'"); see also James M. Hecker, The Citizen's Role in Environmental Enforcement: Private Attorney General, Private Citizen, or Both?, NATURAL RES. & ENV'T, Spring 1994, at 31, 31 ("Fifteen federal environmental laws contain citizen suit provisions. Their basic function is to authorize citizens to enforce the mandatory requirements of those laws against any person when the government fails to do so.").
14 Actually, some academicians argue that breaking the law is a fine thing, so long as the violation is efficient, i.e., the benefits outweigh the costs. See Steven Landsburg, Op-Ed., Highway Robbery, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2002 , at A22 ("If you're willing to pay $500 to do 25 mph in a 20 mph zone, you ought to be speeding."); cf. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193 REV. , 1195 REV. (1985 (attempting "to derive the basic criminal prohibitions from the concept of efficiency"). But see Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1637, 1670 (1998) (acknowledging that attempts "to make economics a source of moral guidance . . . are doomed efforts"); James Grant, Book Review, Price and Punishment, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2010, at A21 (dismissing "the school of legal thought" that adopts Judge Posner's description of crime as "a class of inefficient acts" as follows: "On Planet Tenure, the Ten Commandments seem to have not made much of an inroad"). 15 See, e.g., Mark Schleifstein, Iron Plant Permits to Fuel Debate, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Dec. 27, 2010, at A1 (reporting that a proposed plant "will employ 150 people at an average salary of $75,000" near a grain elevator whose owners "contend[ ] that the air pollutants could harm the elevator's workers and contaminate the grain"); Kate Stevens, DEQ Hears Nucor Comments, ADVOC. (Baton Rouge, La.), Dec. 29, 2010, at 1B (reporting that "[m]ore than 100 people filled a St. James Parish Courthouse meeting room . . . to attend a public hearing" about the Nucor plant, and that a St. James Parish Economic Development Board representative said "'It's jobs, jobs and jobs, and that's what we need,'" while a local pastor expressed concern "about the health of the people living near the site"). 16 See Nat'l Trust for Historic Pres. v. U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, No. 09-5460, 2010
• Will a new levee system improve public safety in southern Louisiana or destroy the very wetlands we count on to cut down storm surges? 17 • With the southern part of the state at risk from rising sea levels, should Louisianans expand use of greenhouse gas emitting fuels, such as coal and petroleum coke? 18 • Should the government build a new highway through a downtown park in historic Lafayette? 19 • Are the environmental burdens of industrialization shared fairly among communities of different racial composition? 20 These are not simple questions and it would be unrealistic to expect all well-meaning people to agree about them.
Why should members of the public have a voice on these types of issues at all? The answer lies partly in the U.S. administrative law system's goal to temper the power of unelected bureaucrats in what is supposed to be a government "by the people." 21 The U.S. Supreme , sixteen coastal scientists and engineers wrote to Governor Blanco to warn that the current proposed project plans [for the Morganza to the Gulf Levee] 'rely on an engineering approach that carries high economic, structural and environmental risk, and threatens the sustainability of the very ecosystem we are all trying to save.'"). 18 See Ex Parte Application of Entergy Louisiana, LLC for Approval to Recover the Costs of the Little Gypsy Unit 3 Repowering Project in Retail Rates, Including Appropriate Ratemaking, and to Cancel the Project at 4, Docket No. U-30192 Phase III (La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Oct. 27, 2009), http://lpscstar.louisiana.gov/star/ViewFile.aspx?Id=63cba8f7-d013-42d4-9dfd-62f7ab7a03bf (seeking approval to cancel conversion of a power plant to burn coal because "the Project was no longer expected to produce net benefits to customers"). 19 See Concerned Citizens Coal. v. 
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Our Constitution was adopted to enable the people to govern themselves, through their elected leaders. The growth of the Executive Branch, which now wields vast power and touches almost every aspect of daily life, heightens the concern that it may slip from the Executive's control, and thus from that of the people.
22
The ability of ordinary people to comment on and challenge agency decisions helps "reintroduce public participation and fairness to affected parties after governmental authority has been delegated to unrepresentative agencies."
23
Public participation also helps to assure that the "agency will have before it the facts and information relevant to a particular administrative problem." 24 For example, one factor that may have contributed to the 2010 BP oil disaster in the Gulf of Mexico was the lack of public participation in approval of Gulf drilling plans. Permit appeals "are sometimes the only way to ferret out and fix problems in the government's voluminous environmental plans." 25 Thus, environmental groups' failure to challenge plans for Gulf drilling meant that the federal "Minerals Management Service had little to fear if they rubber-stamped oil companies' plans, even if they included claims that now seem ridiculous."
26
Litigation in this context is not necessarily a struggle between good and evil. Nor does it always represent a failure of civilized 22 discourse. Instead, it is part of an important dialogue-a process of involving affected people in decisions that will shape their futures.
27
It is the legal profession's job to facilitate that dialogue. 28 And law school clinics can play an important role in helping the profession meet this responsibility.
29
Public participation does not come without a price tag. Especially in the context of highly regulated industries, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that "the expense and annoyance" of legal processes "is part of the social burden of living under government."
30 Courts take such burdens seriously, and one of the ongoing struggles of administrative law is to balance efficiency, fairness, and full consideration of relevant facts. 31 Reviewing courts strive to ensure that judicial review does not become "a forum to engage in unjustified obstructionism."
32 Yet courts must also ensure that agency decisions are "based on a consideration of the relevant factors" and subject to "searching and careful" inquiry-even where the "ultimate standard of [judicial] review is a narrow one." 33 Doubtless, the real-world balance that emerges is less than perfect. 34 But government rarely produces perfect solutions.
35 27 See Resnik, supra note 4, at 806 ("[A]djudication is itself a democratic practice-an odd moment in which individuals can oblige others to treat them as equals as they argue-in public-about alleged misbehavior and wrongdoing."). 28 Lawyers contribute to confusion about their role when they analogize lawsuits-which are peaceful dispute-resolution mechanisms-to battle. See 
B. Drafting Challenges
The de-lawyering bill presented challenges to its drafters. First, despite Senator Adley's "biting the hand that feeds it" rhetoric, the State of Louisiana does not fund TELC. At most, one might allege that some insignificant percentage of the approximately $30,000 per year in capitation fees that Tulane Law School receives from the state contributes to TELC's budget. A threat to withhold some percentage of those fees, however, would hardly be enough to scare a major university into destroying a valued part of its curriculum. To make his threat realistic, therefore, Senator Adley had to widen it to include money that Louisiana pays to Tulane University for "endowed professorships, cancer research, sickle cell clinics, medical residency training and state psychiatric care services" 57 -the vast majority of which has nothing to do with Tulane Law School and much of which pays for direct benefits to the state. This created a credibility problem as the Senator continued to assert that his purpose was to prevent TELC from "taking public taxpayer money to file suits on any social issue or agenda that they may have." 58 Second, in Louisiana "special laws"-i.e., those that pertain to a particular institution (or clinic) 59 -are more difficult to enact than laws of general applicability. The Louisiana Constitution forbids some special laws, including those " [ In an effort to craft a law of general applicability, Senate Bill 549's drafter(s) created a blunt instrument that would have gutted most litigation clinics in Louisiana. The bill would have forbidden clinics-other than those practicing criminal law-from 1) filing "a petition, motion, or suit against a government agency;" 2) "seeking monetary damages;" or 3) "raising state constitutional challenges in state or federal court." 62 It also would have required that all law school clinics "be subject to oversight by the House Committee on Commerce and the Senate Committee on Commerce, Consumer Protection and International Affairs." 63 Senator Adley offered a last minute amendment to limit the bill to "environmental law clinics public and private" during the May 19, 2010 hearing on the bill before the Louisiana Senate Commerce Committee. 64 The Committee, however, declined to consider that proposal. One committee member expressed concerns about the proposed amendment's evenhandedness, wondering why defendants to environmental lawsuits would merit legislative relief but not defendants in divorce cases or prosecutors annoyed by motions filed in defense of alleged criminals. 65 
C. Testimony and Decision
The May 19, 2010 hearing began with Senator Adley, Borné, and Louisiana Oil & Gas Association President Don Briggs sitting together at a witness table to argue for the bill. 66 They focused their presentation on the following points:
• Adley argued that because Tulane University accepts state funding, it is improper for TELC to represent clients who challenge the government on "social issues;" 67 • Borné stated that-although he does not "specifically charge" that TELC engages in barratry-"academic freedom of the classroom is no defense for committing barratry in the Courtroom."
68
• Without providing evidence or examples, Borné claimed that lawsuits filed by TELC's clients have resulted in lost jobs and investments; 69 • Briggs complained that when he had a private meeting with a Louisiana Supreme Court Justice to object to a lawsuit against one of his association's members, "she pointed out very clearly to me that this is an issue that she can't be involved with and has any oversight whatsoever because the lawsuit was filed in a federal court and not a state court."
70
• Adley argued that it is unethical for TELC to recover litigation costs and attorney fees in settlements of federal citizen suits; 71 and • Both Borné and Adley fell back on generalized resentment of Tulane University. Borné argued Tulane University should not receive state money while Southern University, a state school, any social issue or agenda that they may have." Id. Adley ducked Senator Gautreaux's question: "does it boil down to whether or not they're using public funds to file these lawsuits." Id.
Adley's non-answer was: "I think the issue is simple. That to the University, they're receiving public funds and part of the things that the University does is file lawsuits against businesses and government." Id. In other words, Adley did not say that TELC's advocacy of clients is state funded, which it is not. 68 Id. 69 He stated: "Where businesses have been attacked directly, jobs have been lost. . . . Where the attack has centered on DEQ, the permitting time many times has been extended so that companies simply look elsewhere to make investments that have to hit that window of economic opportunity squarely in order to make a clear return on investment." Id.; see also Blum, Panel Derails Law Clinic Bill, supra note 57 (reporting that Borné argued that "[j]obs have been lost"). 70 La. Sen. Hearing Video, supra note 39. Some might be gratified to know that lawsuits are not resolved in Louisiana through private meetings between trade association representatives and Supreme Court justices. See In re Benge, 2009-1617, pp. 28-29 (La. 11/6/09); 24 So. 3d 822, 839 (holding that a judge "violated Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct by failing to decide [a] case on the evidence and testimony presented at trial and further, violated Canon 2A by allowing outside influences to dictate her decision in the case"). If a defendant believes that a lawsuit is unjustified, the appropriate response is to move the court for dismissal of case, FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b); LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 921-34, and/or to seek sanctions, see supra note 56; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 7(b)(1) ("A request for a court order must be made by motion."); LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 961 ("An application to the court for an order, if not presented in some other pleading, shall be by motion which, unless made during trial or hearing or in open court, shall be in writing."). 71 La. Sen. Hearing Video, supra note 39. Adley also introduced testimony by an officer of EnerVest Operating, L.L.C., who complained about paying attorney fees. Id.; see also infra note 180 for a description of the EnerVest case.
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72 Adley complained about the state "giving" $45-47 million to "a private school-private not public-at a time while we're facing budget issues." 73 At the hearing, neither Borné nor Adley came up with any evidence to support past assertions that TELC caused the loss of thousands of jobs and millions of dollars. 74 Apparently, their theory is that these things are self-evident-that any insistence on compliance with environmental laws necessarily equates to economic damage. 75 Adley also offered no evidence to back up past claims (which he did not repeat at the hearing) of "frivolous lawsuits." 76 Borné never explained what he meant when, leading up to the hearing, he charged that TELC "takes credit on its website for preventing investments and jobs from coming to Louisiana."
77 He appears to have simply made up that allegation and assumed that if he said it enough times people would believe him.
Borné did discuss his "barratry" allegation, clarifying that he based it solely on a 19-year-old article by a now-deceased former Dean of Tulane Law School. 78 At the hearing, Borné appeared to concede that this claim was weak, noting "we recognize that this was published [in the Tulane Lawyer] almost twenty years ago," and cautioning that 72 Borné concluded his prepared testimony as follows: "The logic of sending forty-seven million state dollars to Tulane when we're talking about shutting down Southern University of New Orleans does not work for me and I don't think it should work for anyone in the Louisiana State Senate." La. Sen. Hearing Video, supra note 39.
Borné and Adley raised other accusations that they did not develop. Specifically, Borné provided a list of defendants and projects that have been the subject of litigation handled by TELC, apparently to suggest that these lawsuits affected popular projects and good corporate citizens; Adley also argued that TELC was "hiding behind poor people" because it represented clients such as Sierra Club; and Adley argued that Tulane donors were among the list of defendants that TELC's clients had sued. Id.
Borné's implication that lawyers should not assist clients who are opposed to popular projects is contrary to basic principles of the U.S. legal system. See infra note 95 (citing, inter alia, MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 5 (2009) 
D. De-Lawyering Is a Disreputable Tactic
De-lawyering proponents would sacrifice fundamental values underlying our legal system to advance narrow interests of constituents. 86 The press got this right when reporting on Bill 549: "Adley and the LCA were, in effect, thumbing their noses at the law, judicial process and regulation-all areas within the purview of the Legislature to change."
87 If a legislator disagrees with environmental laws, he or she is free to seek their repeal. Similarly, if the legislator thinks it is a mistake for environmental laws to empower citizens to participate in permitting decisions or sue violators, the legislator is free to seek amendment of those provisions. Attempting to repeal environmental laws or eliminate the public's legal standing to sue might be unpopular, but it would still be part of a legitimate dialogue about social policy. But de-lawyering legislation is an attempt to endrun that dialogue by silencing opponents and denying them the practical ability to vindicate legal rights.
88
Trying to silence people with inconvenient opinions is characteristic of a "banana republic" approach to government that is contrary to U.S. legal traditions.
89 Indeed, our "Pledge of Allegiance" does not celebrate "liberty and justice for some," but for all-even people with whom our legislators' most valued constituents disagree. 90 The U.S. legal tradition of affording even people we disagree with an opportunity to vindicate their rights is at least as old as the nation itself. 91 More than a century ago, the U.S. Supreme aimed at impeding the Tulane Environmental Law Clinic from suing state agencies or businesses on behalf of poor citizens, it experienced the rare sensation, usually reserved for its opponents, of being ganged up on in committee and sent packing."); Barrow, supra note 47, at A2 (noting that the outcome was "a rare defeat for the chemical, oil and gas industries."). 86 See David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive PublicInterest Lawyers, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 209, 245 (2003) ("When politics impinges on the imperative to hear both sides, the adversary system threatens to dissolve into farce or fraud."); Fuller & Randall, supra note 3, at 1216 ("Under our system of government the process of adjudication is surrounded by safeguards evolved from centuries of experience. . . . All of this goes for naught if the man with an unpopular cause is unable to find a competent lawyer courageous enough to represent him."). 87 Editorial, A Good Kill, supra note 6, at 22. 88 See generally Luban, supra note 86, at 245 ("Silencing doctrines raise the prospect of an adversary system in which one set of adversaries . . . is relentlessly squeezed by political opponents who would rather muzzle them than argue against them."). 89 See supra notes 1-3. 90 Bryant, supra note 4 ("In the United States of America, we don't pledge allegiance to liberty and justice 'for some.' We must keep the courthouse doors open-and preserve access to justice-for all."). 91 Court recognized that the right to participate in the legal system "lies at the foundation of orderly government."
92 It "is the right conservative of all other rights."
93 Imperfect and frustrating as it may be, litigation is a dispute resolution mechanism that serves as "the alternative of force" and violence. 94 U.S. lawyers live by a code under which one of the "highest services the lawyer can render to society" is to represent people with unpopular or controversial points of view-even when the lawyer does not personally agree with those points of view.
95 This is why ethical lawyers from both sides of the political spectrum condemned political attacks on government lawyers for having formerly represented Guantanamo detainees, as well as attacks on a former solicitor general for representing supporters of the federal Defense of Marriage Act. 96 The Wall Street Journal editorialized, "To drop a case under political pressure is especially unethical. ; see also Olson, supra note 34, at A16 ("Our courts are essential to an orderly, lawful society."). 93 Chambers, 207 U.S. at 148. 94 Id.; see also Bryant, supra note 4 ("Extremely emotional and heated disputes are resolved nonviolently in the courts every day."). 95 Fuller & Randall, supra note 3, at 1216; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 5 (2009) ("Legal representation should not be denied to people who are unable to afford legal services, or whose cause is controversial or the subject of popular disapproval."); id. R. 1.2(b) ("A lawyer's representation of a client . . . does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral views or activities."); id. pmbl. ¶ 1 ("A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is . . . a public citizen having a special responsibility for the quality of justice."); id. pmbl. ¶ 6 ("A lawyer should be mindful of deficiencies in the administration of justice and of the fact that the poor, and sometimes persons who are not poor, cannot afford adequate legal assistance."); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-27 (1980) ("Regardless of his personal feelings, a lawyer should not decline representation because a client or a cause is unpopular or community reaction is adverse."); id. EC 2-28 ("The personal preference of a lawyer to avoid adversary alignment against judges, other lawyers, public officials, or influential members of the community does not justify his rejection of tendered employment." (footnote omitted)); ABA Comm. undermine clinical law school programs to step back and remember that the rule of law cannot survive if pressure prevents lawyers from fulfilling their responsibilities to their clients." 98 The principle that everyone deserves a chance to vindicate his or her rights in the legal system is too important for legislators to sacrifice for the sake of sparing constituents in highly regulated fields the annoyance of hearing opposing voices. 99 There is, of course, a huge gap between the principle that every citizen should have access to the legal system and the reality of the U.S legal-services market.
100 Professor Gene R. Nichol has noted that more than "eighty percent of the legal need of the poor and the near poor-a cohort including at least ninety million Americans-is unmet. As a result, these economically marginalized citizens are left outside the bounds of the effective use of our adjudicatory systems, state and federal."
101 Further, many people who are not poor could not afford the legal fees it would take to bring an enforcement action against a major corporation or to effectively challenge issuance of a permit that might transform the quality of life in a community.
102 Just because we fall short of living up to our ideals, however, is no reason for abandoning those ideals entirely.
III. FEDERAL LAW WOULD PREEMPT STATE DE-LAWYERING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CLINICS' CLIENTS

A. The Supremacy Clause Preempts State Obstruction of a Federal Statutory Purpose
The Supremacy Clause establishes that the "Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be 98 First, They Get Rid of the Law Clinics, supra note 6, at A24. 99 See Luban, supra note 86, at 246 (arguing that steps to combat limitations on access to justice "should be regarded as matters of fundamental procedural justice, not partisan politics"); Fuller & Randall, supra note 3, at 1162-216 (presenting the Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility's conclusion that lawyers have "an affirmative duty to help shape the growth and development of public attitudes toward fair procedures and due process"). 100 Deborah Rhode & James Sokolove, (2008) (holding that the Wagner Act preempts a state law that "prohibits certain employers that receive state fundswhether by reimbursement, grant, contract, use of state property, or pursuant to a state program-from using such funds to assist, promote, or deter union organizing" (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Savings clauses in environmental laws are typically addressed to regulation of pollution, not public participation. For example, Clean Water Act § 510 protects state authority to "adopt or enforce" standards "respecting discharges of pollutants" and "requirement[s] respecting control or abatement of pollution" so long the state rules are not "less stringent" than federal law. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (2006). Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 3009 expressly preempts "any requirements less stringent than those authorized under this subchapter" and preserves state authority to impose "any requirements, including those for site selection, which are more stringent than those imposed by such [ impacts on matters within FERC's control, the State's purpose must be to regulate production or other subjects of state jurisdiction, and the means chosen must at least plausibly be related to matters of legitimate state concern."). In Hines v. Davidowitz, the Court analyzed the relative strength of the state and federal interests at issue, noting that the legislation at issue was "in a field which affects international relations" and that the state's power was "not bottomed on the same broad base as is its power to tax." 312 U.S. 52, 68 (1941); see also Rollins Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Parish of Saint James, 775 F.2d 627, 635 (5th Cir. 1985) ("At the very least, an exercise of legislative rulemaking authority must be a reasonable means of attaining legitimate governmental objectives. Here, of course, the question is . . . whether [the challenged ordinance] trenches impermissibly upon a field preempted by Congress. Nevertheless, the two analyses are related." (citations omitted)). 120 See, e.g., Locke, 529 U.S. at 108 ("[A]n 'assumption' of nonpre-emption is not triggered when the State regulates in an area where there has been a history of significant federal presence"). 121 See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 663-64 (1993) ("[A] court interpreting a federal statute pertaining to a subject traditionally governed by state law will be reluctant to find pre-emption."). 122 Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1195 n.3 (2009) (rejecting the argument that the presumption should not apply "because the Federal Government has regulated drug labeling for more than a century").
accounts for the historic presence of state law but does not rely on the absence of federal regulation.
123
In general, presumptions are strange and unpredictable things. 124 Sometimes they merely assign the burden of producing evidence to the disfavored party but do not affect the burden of proof.
125 This is the "bursting bubble" presumption that, once rebutted, vanishes and no longer affects the outcome. 126 If that was what the presumption against preemption were about, it would not be very significant. 127 Other presumptions, however, change the burden of persuasion.
128
Still others behave like a thumb on the scale of justice, serving throughout the lawsuit to add a vague persuasive force to the favored party's evidence. 129 The nature and effect of the presumption against preemption in this regard remains unclear.
130
Whether there is a presumption or not, of course, state law "must yield" if the Court finds that it is "incompatible with federal legislation."
131 Whether a particular obstacle is "sufficient" to trigger 123 Id. 127 But see Merrill, supra note 106, at 728 (arguing that the "presumption, if consistently applied, would also shift authority for making preemption decisions from the courts to Congress"). 128 See, e.g., Fischer v. S/Y Neraida, 508 F.3d 586, 595 (11th Cir. 2007) (describing a presumption as "'strong' in the sense of imposing a burden of persuasion upon the defendant, and not just a burden of production or of going forward"). 129 See, e.g., United States v. Palmer-Contreras, 835 F.2d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 1987) ("[E]ven after a defendant has introduced some evidence to rebut the flight presumption, the presumption does not disappear, but rather retains evidentiary weight-the amount depending on how closely defendant's case resembles the congressional paradigm-to be considered along with all the other relevant factors." (citation omitted)). 130 See Hoke, supra note 106, at 733 (describing the U.S. Supreme Court's approach to its presumptions as "fickle"). 131 
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132
B. De-Lawyering Is an Obstacle to Accomplishment of Congress' Purpose
Under the "conflict preemption" doctrine, the argument that federal law would have preempted Louisiana Senate Bill 549 is not a difficult sell. Major federal environmental laws unambiguously mandate that states facilitate public participation. The following language from the federal hazardous waste statute-known as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act-is almost identical to language in the Clean Water Act:
Public participation in the development, revision, implementation, and enforcement of any regulation, guideline, information, or program under this chapter shall be provided for, encouraged, and assisted by the Administrator and the States. The Administrator, in cooperation with the States, shall develop and publish minimum guidelines for public participation in such processes.
133
Senator Adley designed his bill as "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution" of that congressional mandate.
134
This is because Senator Adley's proposal was for Louisiana to do the exact opposite of encouraging and assisting public participation. Louisiana Senate Bill 549 would have discouraged public participation by de-lawyering law clinics' clients. The purpose was to "send[ ] a message that Louisiana is open for business" by sending a message that public opposition would be restricted. 135 The fact that Bill 549 relied primarily on conditions attached to state spending would not have saved the bill because "it is not permissible for a State to use its spending power to advance an interest that . . The clear mandates of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and the Clean Water Act provide the most powerful bases for a preemption attack on a bill like 549. It is difficult to imagine how a de-lawyering bill that targeted an environmental law clinic could survive a conflict with federal hazardous waste and clean water laws, since a large percentage of such a clinic's docket is likely to involve programs under these statutes. Plaintiffs may nonetheless wish to base additional arguments for preemption on other federal environmental laws, which use different language, to establish federal policy that favors participation of the public in environmental decisions. 143 For example, the Clean Air Act requires that state's permit programs provide for "public notice, including offering an opportunity for public comment and a hearing, and for expeditious review of permit actions . . . including an opportunity for judicial review."
144 This is 143 Congress' unambiguous determination that public participation serves the public interest is analogous to its decision allowing workers a relatively free hand in labor disputes. In that context, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that "[f]or a state to impinge on the area of labor combat designed to be free is quite as much an obstruction of federal policy as if the state were A claim that the Coastal Zone Management Act preempted a state's failure to "allow for part of a statutory scheme in which "Congress made clear that citizen groups are not to be treated as nuisances or troublemakers but rather as welcomed participants in the vindication of environmental interests."
145
C. De-Lawyering Fails to Rationally Advance State Interests
Given the potential for the state's interest to affect the presence and strength of the presumption against preemption, it is worth establishing that Senate Bill 549 had no reasonable relationship to a legitimate state purpose. States, of course, have "a substantial interest in regulating the practice of law" within their borders. 146 In Louisiana, however, the state Supreme Court "has exclusive and plenary power to define and regulate all facets of the practice of law."
147 Senator Adley, therefore, could not have been invoking the state's authority over the bar. Instead, as an attempt to shield a favored constituency from the risks of litigation, Bill 549 must have been based on the state's general police power.
The Louisiana Legislature's police power is broad. 148 It is not, however, unlimited. The Louisiana Supreme Court has explained that the police power only extends to "reasonable" measures:
A measure taken under the state's police power is reasonable when the action is, under all the circumstances, reasonably necessary and designed to accomplish a purpose properly falling within the scope of the police power. Thus, to sustain public participation before authorizing the private construction of wind farms" was unsuccessful, in part because "nothing in the Act expressly requires Texas to provide for public participation and consistency reviews in wind farm construction." Coastal Habitat Alliance v. Patterson, 385 F. App'x 358, 360-61 (5th Cir. 2010). That case, however, did not concern a delawyering effort and did not involve a mandate that public participation "shall be provided for, ) ("We recognize the importance of leaving States free to select their own bars, but it is equally important that the State not exercise this power in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner nor in such way as to impinge on the freedom of political expression or association.").
147 Succession of Wallace, 574 So. 2d 348, 350 (La. 1991) (emphasis added). 148 See Polk v. Edwards, 626 So. 2d 1128, 1132 (La. 1993) ("The powers of the United States Congress are specifically delineated in the United States Constitution. Conversely, the Louisiana Legislature, as with the legislatures of the other states of the Union, has all powers which have not been denied it by the state constitution.").
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[Vol. 61:4 an action under the state's police power, courts must be able to see that its operation tends in some degree to prevent an offense or evil or otherwise to preserve public health, safety, welfare or morals. Further, an exercise of the state's police power "does not justify an interference with constitutional rights which is entirely out of proportion to any benefit redounding to the public." 149 So the question is whether Senator Adley's de-lawyering bill would have tended "in some degree" to "preserve public health, safety, welfare or morals" and whether any purported benefit was "out of proportion" to the bill's interference with Louisiana's constitutional guarantee of open access to justice. (La. 1986 ) ("The constitutional guarantee providing for open courts and insuring a remedy for injuries does not warrant a remedy for every single injury; it applies only to those injuries that constitute violations of established law which the courts can properly recognize."); cf. Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 971-72 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that the "right of access to the courts is basic to our system of government, and it is well established today that it is one of the fundamental rights protected by the Constitution" and that "Courts have required that the access be 'adequate, effective, and meaningful'" (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 (1977))).
151 Editorial, supra note 52. 152 A brief discussion of these first amendment issues appears infra, at notes 162-65 and accompanying text. "agreed to spend up to $37 million in state economic development funds" on a ConAgra Foods sweet potato facility in Delhi, Louisiana. 154 Other than direct appropriations, state subsidies to qualifying businesses include the Industrial Ad Valorem Tax Exemption Program (a ten-year abatement of local property taxes on qualifying investments), 155 Film Production Transferable Tax Credits, 156 and the Enterprise Zone Program, 157 among others. 158 Can you imagine what would happen if a legislator introduced a bill to prohibit all recipients of these subsidies from 1) filing "a petition, motion, or suit against a government agency," 2) "seeking monetary damages," or 3) "raising state constitutional challenges in state or federal court"? 159 There are no such restrictions on industrial recipients of Louisiana's largess. 160 In fact, the state itself is not shy about simultaneously accepting federal subsidies and suing federal agencies. 161 Senator Adley has offered no justification for applying his "biting the hand" principle to require universities to give up-as a price for doing business with the state-privileges enjoyed by other
[Vol. 61:4 Louisiana residents, without imposing the same rule on others who receive taxpayer dollars.
Further, legislation that conditions government benefits on the sacrifice of first amendment rights is problematic under the U.S. Constitution.
162 When a government is actually funding the program it seeks to regulate, the government may have a say in how that program's directors spend government money. 163 Even that principle is limited when the government seeks to undercut the independence of lawyers with private clients. 164 In any event, the State of Louisiana does not fund TELC, and cannot lawfully exercise control over TELC's advocacy by imposing conditions on the funding of other university programs. . 163 See generally Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). Rust declined to apply Perry where "the Government is not denying a benefit to anyone, but is instead simply insisting that public funds be spent for the purposes for which they were authorized." Id. at 196. The Rust Court upheld regulations that "do not force the Title X grantee to give up abortion-related speech; they merely require that the grantee keep such activities separate and distinct from Title X activities." Id. Also, in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006), the Court held that "[r]estricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee's professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen" because it "simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the employer itself has commissioned or created." Id. at 421-22; see also Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law of Managerial Prerogative, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 44 (2008) ("[W] hen the government hires personnel to speak for it, the government is entitled to regulate the content and even the viewpoint reflected in such speech."). 164 See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 545 (2001) (overturning a law prohibiting Legal Services Corporation lawyers from raising constitutional challenges to state or federal laws because, inter alia, "the enactment under review prohibits speech and expression upon which courts must depend for the proper exercise of the judicial power"); id. at 542 (" [T] here is an 'assumption that counsel will be free of state control.'" (quoting Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1981))). 165 See Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 77-78 (1990) ("What the First Amendment precludes the government from commanding directly, it also precludes the government from accomplishing indirectly."). Borné made the nature of the threat clear in his testimony: "Nothing in this bill would prohibit the law clinic from doing exactly what it's doing today, nothing, but the university would then have to fund all of those services that it gets money from the state for now." La. Sen. Hearing Video, supra note 39. laws because federal and state laws provide specifically for such awards. 166 Indeed, the Louisiana Supreme Court rule that governs student practice confirms that law clinics may "be awarded attorney's fees and costs for the services rendered by the student attorney and supervising attorney in those cases where the awarding of attorney's fees and costs is provided by statute." 167 The American Bar Association's model ethical rules for the legal profession make it clear that attorneys may recover statutory attorney fees in pro bono cases. 168 Third, Adley and Borné have never offered evidence to support their assertion that TELC's advocacy harms the state by causing the loss of jobs and investments. In fact, many scholars believe that, on balance, environmental protection is good for economic development. 169 Further, the evidence is strong that adherence to the 166 . 169 See Lisa P. Jackson, The EPA Turns 40, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 2010, at A17 (arguing that "the last 40 years show no evidence that environmental protection hinders economic growth" and that environmental regulations have "sparked a home-grown environmental protection industry that employs more than 1.5 million Americans"). The EPA has analyzed the costs and benefits of regulation under the Clean Air Act and concluded that from 1970 to 1990 benefits exceeded costs "by a factor of 10 to 100 times." EPA-410-R-99-001, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 1990 1 (1999 . For the 1990 to 2010 period, the agency projected that benefits would exceed costs "by a factor of four to one." Id. at 105. EPA's benefit calculation included avoiding more than $ 4 billion in reduced worker productivity and $ 3.9 billion in reduced agricultural yields due to effects of ground level ozone. rule of law is a better strategy for sustained economic growth than attempting to shortcut the law to benefit favored industries. 170 Borné has argued that because TELC represents clients who participate in permit proceedings, "the permitting time many times has been extended so that companies simply look elsewhere" and "this type of activity . . . helps to prove the point that we have one of the most inhospitable legal climates in the nation." 171 But the process for judicial review of Louisiana permits is remarkably streamlined and rarely suspends the effectiveness of permits.
172 Further, a 2010 study "ranked Louisiana ninth among U. the results in large part to "recent economic competitiveness improvements in Louisiana, such as business tax cuts, governmental ethics reform, the creation of Louisiana FastStart and our focus on business retention and remarkable achievement considering publicity about hurricane risks. According to the study's survey of corporate real estate executives, the key factors in site selection are: "1) work force skills, 2) state and local tax scheme, 3) transportation infrastructure, 4) flexibility of incentive programs, 5) & 6) availability of incentives and utility infrastructure, 7) land/building costs and supply, 8) state economic development strategy, 9) permitting and regulatory structure, and 10) higher education resources." 175 Even if Adley and Borné's unsubstantiated claims of economic damage were taken seriously, de-lawyering lower-income Louisiana residents would not be a responsible reaction. If environmental laws are excessively stringent, or public participation rights are too extensive, the appropriate response is to amend those laws, not to deny lawyers to people seeking to vindicate rights that the law grants them.
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In addition, harming a major university would not be a reasonable response to fears about losing jobs or investments. Tulane University President Cowen explained that Tulane is "the largest private employer in Orleans Parish and one of the largest in the state. . . . To think that anyone would advocate damaging one of the largest employers in the state, that is an anti-economic development agenda if I've ever seen one."
177 Putting aside the importance of Tulane as an employer, educational institutions are important drivers of economic development. Damaging the curriculum and reputation of a major university would be an irrational approach to improving the economy. 178 expansion, as well as our enhanced focus on small business development."). The rankings are based on "a survey of site selection consultants and corporate executives who make location decisions for major business investment projects" and on "quantitative measures linked to a database of new and expanded business activity." Id.
174 Mark Arend, One Piece at a Time, 55 SITE SELECTION 830, 831 (2010). 175 Id. at 835 (numbering format and capitalization style modified) (numbers 5 and 6 were tied). A serious attempt to improve the hospitality of Louisiana's legal climate would presumably address the fact that Louisiana is the only state that has failed to adopt Article II of the Uniform Commercial Code. . 176 See supra note 87 and accompanying text (quoting NEW ORLEANS CITYBUSINESS' statement that "Adley and the LCA were, in effect, thumbing their noses at the law, judicial process and regulation-all areas within the purview of the Legislature to change." Editorial, A Good Kill, supra note 6, at 22 In his article, Adley recounts a phony story in which TELC supposedly sued a company that had already "completed [a cleanup] in accordance with law"-"running up legal costs needlessly" and saying "it would drop the law suit 'only' if the company would pay a settlement to Tulane." Id. at 34. Adley's story would be shocking if it were true, but it is not. Adley claims his story is "a summary of testimony before the Louisiana legislature. ). Some gas producers nonetheless allow mercury to leak onto soils and wetlands from outdated meters that measure pressure in gas pipelines. One of these producers, EnerVest, owned more than 400 mercury meters in the Monroe Gas Field.
Adley claims that EnerVest "found mercury contamination and notified [the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ)] for guidance and supervision" and "notified TELC so that it could be satisfied the law was being followed." Adley, supra note 80, at 34. EnerVest's Bill Page testified, however, that EnerVest began purchasing mercury-meter sites in the Monroe Gas Field in 1998 and he made no claim to have notified LDEQ before 2006-eight years later-or to have notified TELC at all. La After negotiations, TELC's clients settled with EnerVest. That settlement tightened the cleanup standard by more than one third (to 1.5 ppm) generally and by more than one half (to 1 ppm) in sites located near wetlands. It also speeded up replacement of the mercury meters. See decisions behind modern environmental regulatory programs, Congress employed a system of cooperative federalism to preserve at least a semblance of state primacy. 183 The basic outline of this system is that EPA promulgates minimum federal standards and then provides funding and oversight for state implementation of those standards through EPA-approved state regulatory programs. 184 One policy justification for this system is that it allows room for state variation and creativity within the latitude afforded by federal mandates. 185 It is fair to ask, therefore, whether Congress' employment of a cooperative federalist scheme in environmental programs suggests that courts should be reluctant to find state law preempted.
To some extent, the answer is yes, although how much this adds to the presumption against preemption is open to question. When interpreting statutes structured to advance cooperative federalism, the Supreme Court has "not been reluctant to leave a range of permissible choices to the States, at least where the superintending federal agency has concluded that such latitude is consistent with the statute's aims." 186 Similarly, the Court has held that "[w]here coordinate state and federal efforts exist within a complementary administrative framework, and in the pursuit of common purposes, the case for federal pre-emption becomes a less persuasive one." 187 But a bill like Senator Adley's is not part of a "pursuit of common purposes." Senate Bill 549's backers did not purport to find a creative approach to achievement of a federal statutory purpose. Instead, they openly advertised the bill for what it was: an attempt to limit the ability of ordinary citizens to mount legal challenges to environmental permits. 188 The fact that Congress' mandates for public participation are part of a cooperative federalist regulatory scheme should not give states license to enact legislation in direct conflict with them.
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The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and the Clean Water Act each provide a direct mandate for public participation and also a command that EPA promulgate regulations "specifying minimum guidelines for public participation."
190 EPA uses these regulations as guidance and to determine whether to approve state proposals for state implementation (and federal funding) of water discharge and hazardous waste programs. 191 A fair question, then, is whether Congress intended its mandates for public participation to be subsumed in this approval process or whether they have independent force. For two reasons, the answer must be that the mandates have direct preemptive force.
First, EPA's regulations do not fully implement Congress' mandates for public participation because of the regulations' limited scope. EPA can only enforce the regulations within the context of EPA-approved state regulatory programs. 192 The regulations do not less than what would be available in federal court, the EPA argues that the agency can exercise its discretion in determining whether the state program meets the general standard."). In Akiak Native Community, the Ninth Circuit upheld EPA approval of Alaska's Clean Water Act discharge regulatory program despite the fact that Alaska employs a 'loser-pays' rule about attorney fees. See id. at 1167-70. But "Alaska provided, as part of its application to assume control over the NPDES program, a declaration that it will not seek attorney's fees from permit challengers who pursue unsuccessful appeals 'unless the appeal was frivolous or brought simply for purposes of delay.'" Id. at 1170. 192 Environmental laws allow EPA to withdraw approval of state programs that stop meeting minimum federal criteria, including programs that fail to comply with public participation requirements. prevent states from obstructing public participation in federal administrative proceedings. And Senate Bill 549 would have forbidden clinics from helping clients file a petition or suit "against a government agency"-language that includes federal agencies. 193 Thus, even EPA withdrawal of the state's authority to implement federal environmental regulatory programs would not have stopped this de-lawyering bill-if enacted and upheld-from obstructing Congress' goal of enhanced public participation. 194 Second, Congress crafted mandates for public participation using "the language of command"-putting them in terms of what EPA and the states "shall" do-not merely as a preface to an authorization to promulgate rules. 195 In construing a statute, courts "give effect, if possible, to every word Congress used."
196 There is no way to give effect to language that says "[p]ublic participation . . . shall be provided for, encouraged, and assisted by . . . the States,"
197 without recognizing that states may not lawfully obstruct public participation.
E. Mandates for Public Participation Are
Within Congress' Authority When Congress uses the word "shall" to shape state regulatory programs, it is natural to ask whether Congress has respected the bounds of the Tenth Amendment. Tenth Amendment doctrine prohibits Congress from "commandee[ring] the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program." 198 Thus, if Congress' mandates that states encourage public participation were simple commands that states use their legislative and administrative processes to advance federal policy, the constitutionality of the statutes would be shaky at best. But in the context of the cooperative federalism system that the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and the Clean Water Act employ, the seemingly mandatory "shall" language does not since it would likely complicate the issues before a court. The advantage of such a claim is that plaintiffs who prevail under § 1983 are eligible for attorney-fee awards under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 209 As insurance against the chance that a court will dismiss the § 1983 claim, however, the plaintiff's complaint should also allege federalquestion jurisdiction created by the Constitution itself. 210 To make a case under § 1983, "a plaintiff must first show a violation of the Constitution or of federal law, and then show that the violation was committed by someone acting under color of state law." 211 Somewhat confusingly, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that "the Supremacy Clause, of its own force, does not create rights enforceable under § 1983." 212 Instead, that clause "'secure[s] federal rights by according them priority whenever they come in conflict with state law.'" 213 A violation of the statute with preemptive effect is not, however, required for § 1983 to apply. This is because § 1983 "speaks in terms of 'rights, privileges, or immunities,' not violations of federal law." 214 In other words, although plaintiffs cannot use § 1983 to enforce the Supremacy Clause in the abstract, they can use § 1983 to enforce that clause's effect of preventing conflicting state laws from compromising their enjoyment of rights under federal law. 215 
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[Vol. 61:4 for, encourage, and assist the public's participation should be "specific and definite" enough to clear this hurdle. The statutory language is not "so manifestly precatory that it could not fairly be read" as binding. 217 Further, Congress must have intended these mandates to benefit, at least in part, members of the public who wish to participate. 218 Section 1983 is not available if its use would bypass "remedial devices provided in a particular Act" when those devices are "sufficiently comprehensive." 219 In the National Sea Clammers Ass'n case, the Court ruled that the Clean Water Act and Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act's comprehensive enforcement mechanisms-including citizen-suit provisions-barred the plaintiffs from using § 1983 to sue for damages from water pollution. 220 But a challenge to de-lawyering legislation would not be a lawsuit about pollution; instead, it would enforce the right, secured by the Supremacy Clause, to participate in implementation of federal law without interference from conflicting state action. 221 There is no
[Vol. 61:4 unconstitutional de-lawyering laws who prevail under § 1983 should be able to recover their attorney fees from the offending state actor.
V. CONCLUSION
Society is unlikely to develop a consensus soon about the appropriate balance between environmental protection and other goals. So disputes about environmental issues will likely continue to frustrate members of the regulated community, environmentalists, grass roots activists, and their lawyers. We will sometimes become angry with one another. Nonetheless, at bottom, the effort to protect communities from environmental degradation is a struggle to persuade our fellow citizens, not to defeat some "other" side. We are engaged in a dialogue-not warfare-and if we conduct that dialogue well, we will achieve results that should be viewed as legitimate. Conducting the dialogue well means allowing all sides to participate, in accordance with our laws and with respect for each other and for U.S. legal traditions.
De-lawyering is not dialogue. It is an attempt to end discussion by blocking people's ability to use laws that entitle them to a voice in decisions that affect their lives. Those interested in upholding U.S. legal traditions and the rule of law should join in stripping any veneer of respectability from de-lawyering efforts. We should hew to the example of John Adams-one of the founders of the U.S. experiment in government "by the people" 225 -who stepped up to ensure that even British soldiers who participated in the Boston massacre were afforded legal representation without regard for the inevitable "clamor and popular suspicions and prejudices." 226 In the United States of America, reputable members of society seek to advance their interests under the law-not by "kneecapping" those who provide legal representation to people they disagree with.
Congress' mandates for public participation in environmental implementation are the law of the land. The U.S. Constitution's Supremacy Clause should therefore preempt conflicting state delawyering laws and provide one tool for keeping the public dialogue about environmental protection going.
only where the suit was vexatious, frivolous, or brought to harass or embarrass the defendant.").
225 LINCOLN, supra note 21, at 536. 226 See DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 66 (2001) ("As a lawyer, his duty was clear. That he would be hazarding his hard-earned reputation and, in his words, 'incurring a clamor and popular suspicions and prejudices' against him, was obvious . . . .").
